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Abstract
We introduce the model of line-up elections which captures parallel or sequential
single-winner elections with a shared candidate pool. The goal of a line-up election
is to find a high-quality assignment of a set of candidates to a set of positions such
that each position is filled by exactly one candidate and each candidate fills at most
one position. A score for each candidate-position pair is given as part of the input,
which expresses the qualification of the candidate to fill the position. We propose
several voting rules for line-up elections and analyze them from an axiomatic and an
empirical perspective using real-world data from the popular video game FIFA.
Keywords— Single-winner voting, Multi-winner voting, Assignment problem,
Axiomatic analysis, and Empirical analysis.
1 Introduction
Before the start of the soccer World Cup 2014, Germany’s head coach Joachim Lo¨w had
problems to find an optimal team formation. Due to several injuries, Lo¨w was stuck
without a traditional striker. He decided to play with three offensive midfielders instead,
namely, Mu¨ller, O¨zil, and Go¨tze. However, he struggled to decide who of the players
should play in the center, on the right, and on the left.1 At the final coaching meeting, he
surveyed the opinions of ten coaching assistants asking for each of the candidates, “Is this
candidate suitable to play on the left/in the center/on the right?”. Coaching assistants
were allowed to approve an arbitrary subset of candidate-position pairs. He got answers
resulting in the following numbers of approvals for each candidate-position pair:
Candidate
Position
Left Center Right
Mu¨ller 5 10 9
O¨zil 3 8 5
Go¨tze 4 7 4
∗Supported by the DFG project MaMu (NI 369/19).
†Supported by a Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Award from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
‡Supported by the DFG project AFFA (BR 5207/1 and NI 369/15).
1This story and the opinions of the coaches are fictional. However, Lo¨w really faced the described
problem before the World Cup 2014.
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After collecting the results, some of the coaches argued that Mu¨ller must play in the
center, as everyone agreed with this. Others argued that Mu¨ller should play on the right,
as otherwise this position would be filled by a considerably less suitable player. Finally,
someone pointed out that Mu¨ller should play on the left, as this was the only possibility
to fill the positions such that every position gets assigned a player approved by at least
half of the coaches.
The problem of assigning Mu¨ller, O¨zil, and Go¨tze can be modeled as three parallel
single-winner elections with a shared candidate pool, where every candidate can win at
most one election and each voter is allowed to cast different preferences for each election.
In our example, the coaches are the voters, the players are the candidates and the three
locations on the field are the positions. Classical single-winner voting rules do not suffice
to determine the winners in such settings, as a candidate may win multiple elections. Also
multi-winner voting rules cannot be used, as a voter can asses the candidates differently
in different elections. Other examples of parallel single-winner elections with a shared
candidate pool include a company that wants to fill different positions after an open call
for applications, a cooperation electing an executive board composed of different positions,
and a professor who assigns students to projects.
In this paper, we introduce a framework for such settings: In a line-up election, we get
as input a set of candidates, a set of positions, and for each candidate-position pair a score
expressing how suitable this candidate is to win the election for this position. The goal of
a line-up election is to find a “good” assignment of candidates to positions such that each
position gets assigned exactly one candidate and each candidate is assigned at most once.
There exist multiple possible sources of the scores. For instance, a variety of single-winner
voting rules aggregate preference profiles into single scores for each candidate and then
select the candidate with the highest score as the winner of the given election. Examples
of such rules include Copeland’s voting rule, where the score of a candidate is the number
of her pairwise victories minus the number of her pairwise defeats, positional scoring rules,
or Dodgson’s voting rule. Thus, line-up elections offer a flexible framework that can be
built upon a variety of single-winner voting rules.
Our Contributions. This paper introduces line-up elections—parallel single-winner
elections with a shared candidate pool—and initiates a study thereof. After stating the
problem formally, we propose two classes of voting rules, sequential and OWA-rules.
Sequential rules fill positions in some order—which may depend on the scores—and select
the best still available candidate for a given position. In the versatile class of OWA-
rules, a rule aims at maximizing some ordered weighted average (OWA) of the scores of
the assigned candidate-position pairs. We highlight seven rules from these two classes.
Subsequently, inspired by work on voting, we describe several desirable axioms for line-up
voting rules and provide a comprehensive and diverse picture of their axiomatic properties.
We complement this axiomatic analysis by empirical investigations on data from the
popular soccer video game FIFA [10] and synthetic data.
As our model considers multiple, parallel single-winner elections, it can be seen as
an extension of single-winner elections; indeed, we can view the scores of candidates
for a position as obtained from some voting rule [2, 8, 29]. It reduces to multi-winner
voting [13] if every voter casts the same vote in all elections. Most of our proposed axioms
are generalizations of axioms studied in those settings [4, 11, 29]. Previously, committee
elections where the committee consists of different positions were rarely considered. Aziz
and Lee [6] studied multi-winner elections where a given committee is partitioned into
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different sub-committees and each candidate is suitable to be part of some of these sub-
committees.
We defer several details of many discussions and proofs to the appendix.
2 Our Model
In a line-up election E, we are given a set of m candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and q posi-
tions P = {p1, . . . , pq} with m ≥ q, together with a score matrix S ∈ Qm×q. For i ∈ [m]
and j ∈ [q], Si,j is the score of candidate ci for position pj , which we denote as scorepj (ci).
An outcome of E is an assignment of candidates to positions, where each position is as-
signed exactly one candidate and each candidate gets assigned to at most one position. We
call an outcome a line-up pi and write, for a position p ∈ P , pip ∈ C to denote the candidate
that is assigned to position p in pi. We write a line-up pi as a q-tuple pi = (pip1 , . . . pipq) ∈ Cq
with pairwise different entries.
For a candidate-position pair (c, p) ∈ C×P , we say that (c, p) is assigned in pi if pip = c
and write (c, p) ∈ pi. Moreover, for an outcome pi and a candidate c, let pi(c) ∈ P ∪ {}
be the position that c is assigned to in pi; that is, pi(c) = p if pip = c and pi(c) =  if c
does not occur in pi. We write c ∈ pi if pi(c) 6= , and c /∈ pi otherwise. For a line-
up pi and a subset of positions P ′ ⊆ P , we write pi|P ′ to denote the tuple pi restricted to
positions P ′ and piP ′ to denote the set of candidates assigned to positions P ′ in pi. For a
position p ∈ P and line-up pi, we write scorep(pi) to denote scorep(pip). Moreover, we refer
to (scorep1(pi), . . . , scorepq(pi)) as the score vector of pi. A line-up voting rule f maps a
line-up election E to a set of winning line-ups, where we use f(E) ⊆ 2Cq to denote the
set of winning line-ups returned by rule f applied to election E.
3 Line-Up Elections as Assignment Problems
It is possible to interpret line-up elections as instances of the Assignment Problem, which
aims to find a (maximum weight) matching in a bipartite graph. The assignment graph G
of a line-up election (S, C, P ) is a complete weighted bipartite graph G = (C unionmulti P,E,w)
with edge set E := {{c, p} | c ∈ C ∧ p ∈ P} and weight function w(c, p) := scorep(c)
for {c, p} ∈ E. Every matching in the assignment graph which matches all positions
induces a valid line-up.
The Assignment Problem and its generalizations have been mostly studied from an
algorithmic and fairness perspective [17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24]. For instance, Lesca et al. [23]
studied finding assignments with balanced satisfaction from an algorithmic perspective.
They utilized ordered weighted average operators and proved that finding assignments
that maximize an arbitrary non-decreasing ordered weighted average is NP-hard (see next
section for definitions). One generalization of the Assignment Problem is the Conference
Paper Assignment Problem (CPAP), which tries to find a many-to-many assignment of
papers to reviewers with capacity constraints on both sides [20]. Focusing on egalitarian
considerations, Garg et al. [18] studied finding outcomes of CPAP which are optimal for
the reviewer that is worst off, where they break ties by looking at the next worst reviewer.
They proved that this task is computationally hard in this generalized setting. In contrast
to our work and the work by Lesca et al. [23], Lian et al. [24] employed OWA-operators
in the context of CPAP on a different level. Focusing on the satisfaction of reviewers,
they studied finding assignments maximizing the ordered weighted average of the values
a reviewer gave to her assigned papers and conducted experiments where they compare
different OWA-vectors.
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In contrast to previous work on the Assignment Problem, we look at the problem
through the eyes of voting theorists. We come up with several axiomatic and quantitative
properties that are desirable to fulfill by a mechanism if we assume that the Assignment
Problem is applied in the context of an election.
4 Voting Rules
As we aim at selecting an individually-excellent line-up, a straightforward approach is to
maximize the social welfare, which is determined by the scores of the assigned candidate-
position pairs. However, it is not always clear which type of social welfare may be of
interest. For example, the overall performance of a line-up may depend on the perfor-
mance of the worst candidate. This may apply to team sports. Sometimes, however,
the performance of a line-up is proportional to the sum of the scores and it does not
hurt if some positions are not filled by a qualified candidate. OWA-operators provide
a convenient way to express both these goals, as well as a continuum of middle-ground
approaches [27].
OWA-rules FΛ . For a tuple a = (a1, . . . , ak) and i ∈ [k], let a[i] be the i-th largest entry
of a. We call Λ := (λ1, . . . , λk) an ordered weighed-average vector (OWA-vector) and
define the ordered weighted average of a under Λ as Λ(a1, . . . , ak) :=
∑
i∈[k] λi · a[i] [27].
For a line-up pi, we define Λ(pi) as the ordered weighted average of the score vector of pi
under Λ. That is, Λ(pi) := Λ
(
scorep1(pi), . . . , scorepq(pi)
)
. The score of a line-up pi assigned
by an OWA-rule fΛ is Λ(pi). Rule fΛ chooses (possibly tied) line-ups with the highest
score.
Among this class of rules, we focus on the following four natural ones, quite well
studied in other contexts, such as finding a collective set of items [5, 9, 12, 26]:
• Utilitarian rule fut: Λut := (1, . . . , 1). This corresponds to computing a maxi-
mum weight matching in the assignment graph. It is computable in O(m3) time
for m candidates [21].
• Egalitarian rule f eg: Λeg := (0, . . . , 0, 1). This corresponds to solving the Linear
Bottleneck Assignment Problem, which can be done in O(m2) time for m candi-
dates [17].
• Harmonic rule fhar: Λhar := (1, 12 , 13 , . . . , 1q ). The computational complexity of
finding a winning line-up under this rule is open. In our experiments, we compute
it using Integer Linear Programming (ILP).
• Inverse harmonic rule f ihar: Λihar := (1q , 1q−1 , . . . , 12 , 1). While computing the win-
ning line-up for an arbitrary non-decreasing OWA-vector is NP-hard [23], the com-
putational complexity of computing this specific rule is open. We again use an ILP
to compute a winning line-up.
Sequential-rules F seq . OWA-rules require involved algorithms and cannot be applied
by hand easily. In practice, humans tend to solve a line-up election in a simpler way,
for instance, by determining the election winners one by one. This procedure results in
a class of quite intuitive sequential voting rules. A sequential rule is defined by some
function g that, given a line-up election E = (S, C, P ) and a set of already assigned
candidates Cas and positions Pas, returns the next position to be filled. This position is
then filled by the remaining candidate C \ Cas with the highest score on this position.
Sequentializing decisions which partly depend on each other has also proven to be useful
in other voting-related problems, such as voting in combinatorial domains [22], or in the
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non Pareto reasonable score position mono- line-up
wasteful optimal satisfaction consistent consistent tonicity enlargement
fut S S − S W S S
fhar S S − − − − −
f ihar S S − − − − −
f eg W† W† − − W −† W†
f seqfix S W − W W S S
f seqmax S W S − W S S
f seqmin S − − − W − −
Table 1: Overview of axiomatic properties of all studied rules. For each of the axioms,
we indicate whether this axiom is strongly satisfied (S), only weakly satisfied (W), or not
satisfied at all (−). For the egalitarian rule, all entries marked with a † can be improved if
a variant of this rule that selects the egalitarian outcome with the highest summed score
is used.
House Allocation problem in form of the well-known mechanism of serial dictatorship.
We focus on the following three linear-time computable sequential rules.
Fixed-order rule f seqfix . Here, the positions are filled in a fixed order (for simplicity, we
assume the order in which the positions appear in the election). The fixed-order sequential
rule is probably the simplest way to generalize single-winner elections to the line-up setting
and it enables us to make the decisions separately. Moreover, it is not necessary to evaluate
all candidates for all positions, which is especially beneficial if evaluating the qualification
of a candidate on a position comes at some (computational) cost.
Max-first rule f seqmax. In the max-first rule, at each step the position with
the highest still available score is filled. That is, g(S, C, P, Cas, Pas) :=
arg maxp∈P\Pas maxc∈C\Cas scorep(c). This is equivalent to adding at each step the remain-
ing candidate-position pair with the highest score to the line-up. Max-first is intuitively
appealing because a candidate who is outstanding at a position is likely to be assigned
to it. Notably, this rule is an approximation of the utilitarian rule, as it corresponds
to solving the Maximum Weight Matching problem in the assignment graph by greedily
selecting the remaining edge with the highest weight. For every possible tie-breaking, this
approach is guaranteed to yield a 12 -approximation of the optimal solution in polynomial
time [3].
Min-first rule f seqmin. In the min-first rule, the position with the lowest score of
the most-suitable remaining candidate is filled next. That is, g(S, C, P, Cas, Pas) :=
arg minp∈P\Pas maxc∈C\Cas scorep(c). The reasoning behind this is that the deciders fo-
cus first on filling critical positions where all candidates perform poorly.
5 Axiomatic Analysis of Voting Rules
We propose several axioms and properties that serve as a starting point to characterize
and compare the introduced voting rules. We checked all introduced voting rules against
all the axioms and collected the results in Table 1 (see Subsection A.3 for all proofs).2 We
2To convey an intuitive understanding of the axioms, we present in Subsection A.2 for each of them
an undesirable example that might occur if a voting rule that violates this axiom is used.
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will introduce two efficiency and one fairness axiom for line-ups. These definitions extend
to voting rules as follows. A voting rule f strongly (weakly) satisfies a given axiom if for
each line-up election E, f(E) contains only (some) line-ups satisfying the axiom.
Efficiency axioms. As our goal is to select individually-excellent outcomes, we aim at
selecting line-ups in which the score of each position is as high as possible. Independent
of conflicts between positions, there exist certain outcomes which are suboptimal. For
example, it is undesirable if there exists an unassigned candidate that is more suitable for
some position than the currently assigned one.
Axiom 1. Non-wastefulness: In a line-up election (S, C, P ), a line-up pi is non-
wasteful if there is no unassigned candidate c /∈ pi and a position p ∈ P such that
scorep(c) > scorep(pi).
This axiom implies that in the special case of a single position, the candidate with
the highest score for the position wins the election. In the context of non-wastefulness,
we only examine whether a line-up can be improved by assigning unassigned candidates.
However, it is also possible to consider arbitrary rearrangements. This results in the
notion of score Pareto optimality.
Axiom 2. Score Pareto optimality: In a line-up election (S, C, P ), a line-up pi is score
Pareto dominated if there exists a line-up pi′ such that for all p ∈ P , scorep(pi′) ≥ scorep(pi)
and there exists a position p ∈ P with scorep(pi′) > scorep(pi). A line-up is score Pareto
optimal if it is not score Pareto dominated.
While all OWA-rules with an OWA-vector containing no zeros are clearly strongly non-
wasteful and strongly score Pareto optimal, the egalitarian rule satisfies both axioms only
weakly, as this rule selects a line-up purely based on its minimum score. All sequential
rules naturally satisfy strong non-wastefulness. Yet, by breaking ties in a suboptimal
way, all of them may output line-ups that are not score Pareto optimal. While for the
fixed-order rule and the max-first rule at least one winning outcome is always score Pareto
optimal, slightly counterintuitively, there exist instances where the min-first rule does not
output any score Pareto optimal line-ups.
Fairness axioms. Another criterion to judge the quality of a voting rule is to assess
whether positions and candidates are treated in a fair way. The underlying assumption
for fairness in this context is that every position should have the best possible candidate
assigned. Similarly, from candidates’ perspective, one could argue that each candidate
deserves to be assigned to the position for which the candidate is most suitable. In
the following, we call a candidate or position for which fairness is violated dissatisfied.
Unfortunately, line-ups in which all positions and candidates are satisfied simultaneously
may not exist. That is why we consider a restricted fairness property, where we call a
candidate-position pair (c, p) ∈ pi reasonably dissatisfied in pi if candidate c has a higher
score for p than pip and c is either unassigned or c’s score for p is higher than for pi(c).
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Axiom 3. Reasonable satisfaction: A line-up pi is reasonably satisfying if there are
no two positions p and p′ such that
scorep(pip′) > scorep(pip) and scorep(pip′) > scorep′(pip′)
and there is no candidate c /∈ pi and position p such that scorep(c) > scorep(pip).
3For a more extensive discussion of reasonable satisfaction, see Subsection A.1.
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It is straightforward to prove that all winning line-ups under the max-first rule are rea-
sonably satisfying; hence, a reasonably satisfying outcome always exists. Note that it is
also possible to motivate reasonable satisfaction as a notion of stability if we assume that
candidates and positions are allowed to leave their currently assigned partner to pair up
with a new candidate or position. Thus, reasonable satisfaction resembles the notion of
stability in the context of the Stable Marriage problem [16].
However, fulfilling reasonable satisfaction may come at the cost of selecting a line-up
that is suboptimal for various notions of social welfare. For some  > 0, consider an
election with P = {p1, p2}, C = {a, b}, scorep1(a) = 2, scorep2(a) = scorep1(b) = 2 − ,
and scorep2(b) = 0. We see that the outcome (b, a) of utilitarian welfare 4− 2 maximizes
utilitarian social welfare, while the outcome (a, b) of utilitarian welfare 2 is the only
outcome satisfying reasonable satisfaction. Therefore, it is interesting to measure the
price of reasonable satisfaction in terms of utilitarian welfare. Analogous to the price
of stability [1], we define this as the maximum utilitarian social welfare achievable by
a reasonably satisfying outcome, divided by the maximum achievable utilitarian social
welfare. The example from above already implies that this price is upper bounded by 12 .
In fact, this bound is tight, as the max-first rule that only outputs reasonably satisfying
line-ups is a 12 -approximation of the utilitarian outcome.
Voting axioms. We now formulate several axioms that are either closely related to
axioms from single-winner [29] or multi-winner voting [11]. We define all axioms using
two parts, (a) and (b). On a high level, condition (a) imposes that certain line-ups should
be winning after modifying a line-up election, while condition (b) demands that no other
line-ups become (additional) winners after the modifications. If a voting rule only fulfills
condition (a), then we say that it weakly satisfies the corresponding axiom. If it fulfills
both conditions, then we say that it strongly satisfies the corresponding axiom.
In single-winner and multi-winner voting, the consistency axiom requires that if a
voting rule selects the same outcome in two elections (over the same candidate set), then
this outcome is also winning in the combined election [28]. We consider a variant of this
axiom, adapted to our setting.
Axiom 4. Score consistency: For two line-up elections (S, C, P ) and (S′, C, P ) with
f(S, C, P ) ∩ f(S′, C, P ) 6= ∅ it holds that: a) f(S, C, P ) ∩ f(S′, C, P ) ⊆ f(S + S′, C, P )
and b) f(S, C, P ) ∩ f(S′, C, P ) ⊇ f(S + S′, C, P ).
The utilitarian rule is the only OWA-rule that satisfies weak (and even strong) score
consistency. The fixed-order rule is the only other considered rule that satisfies weak
score consistency. For all other rules, it is possible to construct simple two-candidates
two-positions line-up elections where this axiom is violated.
We now consider a different way of combining two line-up elections which is special to
our setting. In line-up elections, it is possible to combine the set of considered positions:
Imagine that we split a line-up election into two sub-elections with the same candidate
set in both elections and partly overlapping sets of positions. Assume further that the
considered voting rule outputs a winning outcome of the fist sub-election and a winning
outcome of the second sub-election such that all shared positions are filled by the same
candidates and all non-shared positions by different candidates that do not appear in
the other line-up at all. Now, considering the full election on all positions, the union of
these outcomes should then be a winning outcome. Formally, we say that two line-ups, pi′
defined on P ′ and pi′′ defined on P ′′, are overlapping-disjoint if they assign the same
candidates on all positions from P ′ ∩ P ′′ and a disjoint set of candidates to the other
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positions. For two overlapping-disjoint line-ups pi′ and pi′′, we write pi′ ∪ pi′′ to denote the
line-up pi∗ combining the two, that is, for all p ∈ P ′ : pi∗p = pip and for all p ∈ P ′′ : pi∗p = pi′p.
Axiom 5. Position consistency: Let (S, C, P ) be a line-up election and P ′, P ′′ ⊆ P two
subsets of positions with P ′∪P ′′ = P . If there exist two overlapping-disjoint outcomes pi′ ∈
f(S, C, P ′) and pi′′ ∈ f(S, C, P ′′), then it holds that (a) pi′ ∪ pi′′ ∈ f(S, C, P ) and (b) for
all pi∗ ∈ f(S, C, P ), there exist overlapping-disjoint pi′ ∈ f(S, C, P ′) and pi′′ ∈ f(S, C, P ′′)
such that pi∗ = pi′ ∪ pi′′.
It is easily possible to construct small instances for all considered voting rules where
strong position consistency is violated. However, all rules except the two harmonic rules
satisfy the axiom in the weak sense. The harmonic rules fail the axiom because it is
possible to exploit the fact that by extending the election, the coefficient by which a score
in the line-up is multiplied changes compared to the two sub-elections.
Besides focusing on consistency related considerations, it is also important to examine
how the winning line-ups change if the election itself is modified. We start by considering
a variant of monotonicity [14].
Axiom 6. Monotonicity: Let (S, C, P ) be a line-up election with a winning line-up pi.
Let (S′, C, P ) be the line-up election obtained from (S, C, P ) by increasing scorep(pip) for
some p. Then, it holds that (a) pi is still a winning line-up, that is, pi ∈ f(S′, C, P ),
and (b) no new winning line-ups are created, that is, for all pi′ ∈ f(S′, C, P ) it holds
that pi′ ∈ f(S, C, P ).
While the utilitarian, fixed-order, and max-first rule all satisfy strong monotonicity,
all other rules fail even weak monotonicity. As these negative results are intuitively
surprising, we present their proof here.
Proposition 1. The egalitarian rule f eg, the harmonic rule fhar, and the min-first
rule f seqmin all violate weak monotonicity.
Proof. We present counterexamples for all three rules:
E1 :
p1 p2
a 0 3
b 3 0
c 4 0
E2 :
p1 p2 p3
a 4 1 0
b 4.75 3 0
c 0 0 2
E3 :
p1 p2
a 2 1
b 0 0
In E1, (b, a) and (c, a) are winning under f
eg. However, after increasing scorep2(a)
to 4, (c, a) has an egalitarian score of 4 and thereby becomes the unique winning
line-up. We now turn to election E2 and voting rule f
har. It is clear that c will
be assigned to p3 in every outcome. In fact, (a, b, c) is the winning line-up in E2,
as Λhar(a, b, c) = 1 · 4 + 12 · 3 + 13 · 2 > 1 · 4.75 + 13 · 1 + 12 · 2 = Λhar(b, a, c). After increas-
ing scorep3(c) to 3, (b, a, c) becomes the unique winning line-up in E2, as Λ
har(a, b, c) =
1 · 4 + 12 · 3 + 13 · 3 < 1 · 4.75 + 13 · 1 + 12 · 3 = Λhar(b, a, c). By the modification, the
score of (b, a, c) increases more than the score of (a, b, c), because in (b, a, c) scorep3(c) is
multiplied by a larger coefficient. Lastly, considering f seqmin, (b, a) is the unique winning
outcome in E3. After increasing scorep2(a) to 3, the ordering in which the positions get
assigned changes, and thereby, (a, b) becomes the unique winning line-up.
In the context of multi-winner voting, an additional monotonicity axiom is sometimes
considered: Committee enlargement monotonicity deals with the behavior of the set of
winning outcomes if the size of the committee is increased [7, 11]. We generalize this
axiom to our setting in a straightforward way.
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Axiom 7. Line-up enlargement monotonicity: Let (S, C, P ) be a line-up election
and let (S′, C, P ′) with P ′ = P ∪ {p∗} be an election where position p∗ and the scores of
candidates for this position have been added. It holds that (a) for all pi ∈ f(S, C, P ) there
exists some pi′ ∈ f(S′, C, P ′) such that piP ⊂ pi′P ′ and (b) for all pi′ ∈ f(S′, C, P ′) there
exists some pi ∈ f(S, C, P ) such that piP ⊂ pi′P ′.
Note that line-up enlargement monotonicity does not require that the selected candi-
dates are assigned to the same position in the two outcomes pi and pi′. Despite the fact
that this axiom seems to be very natural, neither of the two harmonic rules satisfy it at
all. Intuitively, the reason for this is that by introducing a new position, the coefficients
in the OWA-vector “shift”. Moreover, surprisingly, the min-first rule also violates the
weak version of this axiom. The proof for this consists of a rather involved counterex-
ample (see Theorem 13 in the appendix) exploiting the fact that by introducing a new
position, the order in which the positions are filled may change. All other rules, apart
from the egalitarian one, satisfy strong line-up enlargement monotonicity; the egalitar-
ian rule satisfies line-up enlargement monotonicity only in the weak sense. We conclude
with presenting the proof that the utilitarian rule, fut, satisfies weak line-up enlargement
monotonicity, as the proof nicely illustrates how it is possible to reason about this axiom.
Proposition 2. The utilitarian rule fut satisfies weak line-up enlargement monotonicity.
Proof. Let pi be a winning line-up of the initial election E = (S, C, P ) and let pi′ be a
winning line-up of the extended election E′ = (S′, C, P ∪ {p∗}) such that there exists a
candidate c ∈ C with c ∈ pi and c /∈ pi′. We claim that it is always possible to construct
from pi′ a winning line-up pi∗ of the extended election such that all candidates from pi
appear in pi∗: Initially, we set pi∗ := pi′. As long as there exists a candidate c ∈ C
with c ∈ pi and c /∈ pi∗, we set pi∗pi(c) := c. Let P˜ be the set of all positions where pi′ and pi∗
differ. Note that none of the replacements can change the candidate assigned to p∗. Thus,
it holds that P˜ ⊆ P .
Obviously, all candidates from pi appear in pi∗. For the sake of contradiction, let
us assume that pi∗ is not a winning line-up of the extended election. Consequently, the
summed score of pi∗ has decreased by the sequence of replacements described above,
which implies that the summed scores of candidates on positions from P˜ is higher in pi′
than in pi: Λut(pi|
P˜
) < Λut(pi′|
P˜
). We claim that using this assumption, it is possible to
modify pi such that its utilitarian score increases, which leads to a contradiction, as we
have assumed that pi is a winning line-up. Let pialt be a line-up resulting from copying pi
and then replacing all candidates assigned to positions in P˜ by the candidates assigned
to these positions in pi′. This is possible as p∗ /∈ P˜ . By our assumption, pialt has a higher
utilitarian score than pi. It remains to argue that pialt is still a valid outcome, that is,
every candidate is only assigned to at most one position. This directly follows from the
observation that if p ∈ P˜ with pi′p ∈ pi, then at some point during the construction of pi∗, pi′p
is kicked out of the line-up and is assigned to position pi(pi′p) at some later point, which
implies that pi(pi′p) ∈ P˜ .
Summary. From an axiomatic perspective, the utilitarian rule is probably the most
appealing one. Indeed, it satisfies all axioms except weak reasonable satisfaction, which
imposes quite rigorous restrictions on every rule fulfilling it. For the egalitarian rule,
although this rule is pretty simple, both efficiency axioms are only weakly satisfied and,
slightly surprisingly, score consistency and monotonicity are not satisfied at all. As in 1,
most of the counterexamples for the egalitarian rule utilize that the OWA-vector of this
rule contains some zeros. If one adapts the egalitarian rule such that the egalitarian
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outcome with the highest summed score is chosen, strong non-wastefulness, strong score
Pareto optimality, strong monotonicity, and strong line-up enlargement monotonicity are
additionally satisfied. Note that this variant of the egalitarian rule is still computable in
polynomial time.
Both harmonic rules are less appealing from an axiomatic perspective because they do
not satisfy any of our considered voting axioms. On a high level, as illustrated in 1, this
is because the corresponding OWA-vectors consist of multiple different entries. Thereby,
some modifications change the coefficients by which the scores are multiplied in some
undesirable way. Overall, the contrast between the utilitarian rule and the harmonic rule
is quite remarkable because they come both from the same class and work pretty similarly.
Turning to sequential rules, apart from reasonable dissatisfaction, the fixed-order rule
outperforms the other two. However, a clear disadvantage of the fixed-order rule is that a
returned winning line-up might not be score Pareto optimal. As the max-first rule fulfills
all axioms—except score consistency—at least weakly, and it is the only voting rule that
is reasonably satisfying, this rule is also appealing if satisfaction of the candidates or
positions is an important criterion. The min-first rule, on the other hand, does not
weakly satisfy any axiom except non-wastefulness. The reason for this is that in some
elections modifying the election changes the order in which the positions are filled. The
considerable differences between the max-first and min-first rule are quite surprising, as
they first appear to be symmetric.
6 Experiments
In this section, we analyze the proposed rules experimentally. We first describe how we
generated our data, and then present and analyze the results.
FIFA data. In the popular video game FIFA 19 [10], 18.207 soccer players have their
own avatar. To mimic the quality of a player, experts assessed them on 29 attributes, such
as sprint speed, shot power, agility, and heading [15]. From these, the game computes the
quality of a player on each possible position, such as left striker or right wing-back etc., in a
soccer formation, using a weighted sum of the attribute scores with coefficients depending
on the position in question [25]. We used this data to model a coach of a national team X
that wants to find an “optimal” assignment of players with nationality X to positions in
a formation he came up with. This can be modeled as a line-up election.
In soccer, there exist several possible formations consisting of different positions a team
can play in. We fixed one formation, that is, a set of ten different positions (see Figure 5
in the appendix for a visualization).
In the generated elections, the candidates are some selected number of players of a
given nationality with the highest summed score, the positions are the field positions
in a selected soccer formation, and the scores are those assigned by FIFA 19 for the
player playing on a particular position. We considered 84 national teams (those with over
ten field players in FIFA 19).
Synthetic data. We also generated a synthetic dataset (M2) consisting of 1.000 line-up
elections. Here, every candidate c has a ground qualification µc ∈ [0.4, 0.7] and every
position p has a difficulty αp ∈ [1, 2] both drawn uniformly at random. For each candi-
date c and for each position p, we sample a basic score βc,p from a Gaussian distribution
with mean µc and standard deviation 0.05. The score of a candidate-position pair is then
calculated as: scorep(c) = β
αp
c,p. The intuition behind this is that very talented candidates
are presumably not strongly affected by the difficulty of a position, whereas weaker candi-
dates may feel completely overburdened by a difficult position. In addition, we generated
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Figure 1: Summed score of winning line-ups for different voting rules. The black horizontal
lines indicate the median for the utilitarian rule on the two datasets.
Figure 2: Minimum score in winning line-ups for different voting rules.
another synthetic dataset (M1) that resembles the FIFA data. The description of this
model and the results for it are deferred to Subsection B.3 and Subsection B.5.
For both models, we normalized each line-up election by dividing all scores by the
maximum score of a candidate-position pair.
Analysis of experimental results. We focus on the case of ten candidates on ten
positions, as this is the most relevant scenario in the FIFA setting. However, we also
conducted experiments for twenty candidates on ten positions and twenty candidates
on twenty positions, where we observed the same trends as in the case presented here
(see Subsection B.6 for diagrams). For settings with more candidates than positions,
however, the differences between the rules are less visible. In the following, we refer to
the (possibly invalid) outcome where every position gets assigned its best candidate as
the utopic outcome. To visualize our results, we use violin plots. In a violin plot, the
white dot represents the median, the thick bar represents the interquartile range, and the
thin line represents the range of the data without outliers. Additionally, a distribution
interpolating the data is plotted on both sides of the center.
Comparison of data models. To compare the datasets, we calculated different metrics
designed to measure the amount of “competition” in instances. For example, we calculated
the difference between the summed score of the utopic outcome and the summed score of
a utilitarian outcome (see Subsection B.4 for details). Generally speaking, the M2 model
produces instances with more “competition” than the FIFA data which helps us to make
the differences between the rules more pronounced.
Comparison of voting rules. We compare the different voting rules by examining the
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Figure 3: Gini coefficient of score vector of line-ups for different voting rules.
following four metrics: (i) the summed score of the computed winning line-up pi normalized
by the summed score of the utopic outcome, (ii) the minimum score of a position in the
winning line-up, (iii) the Gini coefficient4. of the score vector, and (iv) the amount of
reasonable dissatisfaction measured as the sum of all reasonable dissatisfactions, that is,
the difference between the score of a position p in pi and the score of a better candidate c
on p if the candidate-position pair (p, c) is reasonably dissatisfied. For the egalitarian
rule, if multiple line-ups are winning, then we always select the line-up with the highest
summed score.
Concerning the summed score (see Figure 1), as expected, all four OWA-rules clearly
outperform the three sequential rules. The OWA-rules all behave remarkably similar,
especially on the FIFA data. The utilitarian rule produces by definition line-ups with
the highest possible summed score, closely followed by the harmonic rule. Turning to the
sequential rules, the min-first rule produces the worst results, while the max-first rule
produces the best results.
Turning to the minimum score (see Figure 2), the OWA-rules mostly outperform the
sequential rules. The two rules with the highest minimum score are the egalitarian rule
and the inverse harmonic rule. The utilitarian and harmonic rule produce slightly worse
results on the easier FIFA data and significantly worse results on the more demanding
M2 data. Among the sequential rules, the min-first rule performs best, sometimes even
outperforming the utilitarian rule, while the max-first rule produces the worst results.
For the Gini coefficient (see Figure 3), the overall picture is quite similar, i.e., rules
that produce line-ups with a higher minimum score also produce line-ups that are more
balanced in general.
Lastly, considering the amount of reasonable dissatisfaction (see Figure 4), by defini-
tion, the max-first rule does not produce any reasonable dissatisfaction. Among the other
rules, the harmonic rule produces the best results followed by the utilitarian rule. The
egalitarian, inverse harmonic, and fixed-order rule all produce around double the amount
of reasonable dissatisfaction, while the min-first rule produces significantly worse results
by an additional factor of two.
Summary. Somewhat surprisingly, all OWA-rules outperform all sequential rules for all
quantities, with only two exceptions: The min-first rule produces pretty balanced out-
comes and the max-first rule produces no reasonable dissatisfaction. However, even if
one aims at optimizing mainly one of these two quantities, it is usually recommendable
4The Gini coefficient is a metric to measure the dispersion of a probability distribution; it is zero
for uniform distributions and one for distributions with a unit step cumulative distribution function (see
Subsection B.2 for a formal definition)
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Figure 4: Reasonable dissatisfaction in winning line-ups for different voting rules.
to use an OWA-rule. Selecting the inverse harmonic rule instead of the min-first rule
results in outcomes which are comparably balanced, have significantly higher summed
and minimum scores, and have way less reasonable dissatisfaction. Using the harmonic
rule instead of the max-first rule will introduce only little reasonable dissatisfaction in
exchange for more balanced line-ups with higher summed and minimum scores. Com-
paring the different OWA-rules to each other, it is possible to differentiate the utilitarian
and harmonic rule on the one side, from the egalitarian and inverse harmonic rule (which
behave particularly similarly) on the other side: Rules from the former class tend to
favor more imbalanced line-ups with lower minimum but higher summed score and less
reasonable dissatisfaction.
7 Discussion
Overall, the considered OWA-rules produce better outcomes than the sequential rules.
Nevertheless, sequential rules might sometimes be at an advantage, since sequential rules
are, generally speaking, more transparent, more intuitive, and easier to explain. If one
requires a sequential rule, either the fixed-order rule or the max-first rule should be
chosen, as the min-first rule violates nearly all studied axioms and produces undesirable
outcomes. Focusing on OWA-rules, the harmonic and inverse harmonic rules are rather to
be avoided, as they fail to fulfill all considered voting and fairness axioms. Comparing the
utilitarian and egalitarian rule, from an axiomatic perspective, the utilitarian rule is at
an advantage, because it satisfies the most axioms among all considered rules. However,
choosing between these two rules in practice should depend on the application, as the
line-ups produced by these rules maximize different metrics. A rule that could somehow
incorporate egalitarian and utilitarian considerations is the product rule, which selects
outcomes with the highest product of scores.
For future work, it would be interesting to look at line-up elections that take as
input the preferences of voters instead of aggregated scores. Analogously to multi-winner
voting, new rules for this setting could, for example, focus on selecting proportional
and diverse, instead of individually-excellent, line-ups. Such a path would also require
developing appropriate axioms. Another possible line of future research could be to run
experiments using preference data to examine the influence of the selected single-winner
voting rule to aggregate the preferences into scores on the selected line-up. There are also
several algorithmic problems that arise from our work. For instance, the computational
complexity of computing a winning outcome under the (inverse) harmonic rule and even
more generally of computing winning outcomes for arbitrary non-increasing OWA-rules
is open.
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A Axiomatic Analysis
A.1 Reasonable Dissatisfaction
Recall that it is possible to model the following situation as a line-up election: A company
wants to fill different positions in different teams of the company and publishes an open
call for applications to which several candidates respond. The task is then to assign
the candidates to the positions in the company. In such a setting, each group offering
a job wants to get the best candidate for the job and is unsatisfied if this is not the
case. Similarly, each candidate wants to be assigned to the position she is most suitable
for. The reasoning behind this is that presumably every candidate prefers to do tasks
for which she is qualified and wants to make most out of herself. Unfortunately, line-ups
which assign all candidates to their best position and each position its best candidate
may not exist. That is why it is necessary to differentiate between different types of
dissatisfaction. For example, the dissatisfaction of a candidate who is way less suitable
for all positions than all other candidates is hard to circumvent. In contrast, imagine
there exists a candidate c who is unsatisfied, as she is either not assigned or assigned to a
position for which she is less qualified than for another position p for which, even more,
she is more suitable than the current candidate filling p. Then, the dissatisfaction of c
and the dissatisfaction of p are quite reasonable and voters might agree that assigning c
to her current position treated her and position p unfairly. This setup shall motivate
and illustrate our definition of reasonable dissatisfaction presented in the main body of
the paper. Interestingly, every winning line-up under the max-first rule is reasonable
satisfying, which proves the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In every line-up election, an outcome without reasonable dissatisfaction
is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Let E be a line-up election. We claim that all winning line-ups pi of E under the
max-first rule are reasonably satisfying, which proves the proposition. Assume that there
exist two positions p and p′ fulfilling the first condition for reasonable dissatisfaction.
Then, if p has been filled by the rule before p′, then it needs to hold that scorep(pip) ≥
scorep(pip′), thereby contradicting the condition. If p
′ were filled by the algorithm before p,
then it would need to hold that scorep′(pip′) ≥ scorep(pip′), thereby contradicting the
condition. No candidate c /∈ pi and position p can fulfill the second condition of reasonable
satisfaction, as otherwise c would have been assigned to p.
A.2 Intuitive Explanations of Axioms
In the following, we try to give a more intuitive understanding of the considered axioms
by interpreting them in the language of our introductory soccer example. Here, the
candidates are the players of the team and positions are positions in a soccer formation.
Scores of candidate-positions pairs are derived from approvals of the coaching staff. For
all axioms, we present a plausible drawback that might occur if this axiom is violated.
Non-wastefulness After agreeing on a line-up, the coaches realize that there exists a
position and an unassigned player such that the coaches agree that he is more
suitable to fill this position than the currently assigned player.
Score Pareto optimality After agreeing on a line-up, the coaches realize that there
exists a different line-up where the coaches agree that, taking all positions into
account, this line-up is better than the one which they decided for.
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Score consistency The team of defensive coaches meets and agrees on a line-up. At
the same time, the team of offensive coaches meets and agrees independently on the
same line-up. Afterwards, all coaches meet together and agree on a line-up that is
different from the one that each set of coaches came up with independently.
Position consistency The defensive coaches agree on a line-up of defenders and mid-
fielders. The offensive coaches agree on a line-up of strikers and midfielders. Both
line-ups coincide on the midfielders and no player who is placed as a defender in the
first line-up is placed as a striker in the second line-up. However, in a joint meeting,
the coaches decide on a full line-up that is different from the line-up of the defensive
coaches on the defenders or midfielders (despite the fact that it would have been
possible to combine the two initial line-ups).
Monotonicity The coaches agree on a line-up for a game. In this game, the center-
forward plays very well, so afterwards more coaches believe that he is suitable to fill
this position. All other opinions remain unchanged. In the next game, some other
line-up is chosen.
Line-up enlargement monotonicity In a training session on a smaller field, the
coaches select their best line-up consisting out of five players. The day later, for the
next normal game with eleven players, one of these players is benched.
Reasonable satisfaction The team has a star player where everyone agrees that he is a
perfect center-forward and better than everyone else on this position. In the current
line-up, he is placed in the midfield and very unsatisfied and demotivated by this.
A.3 Missing Proofs
In the following, we provide for all considered rules and axioms proofs whether the rule
satisfies the axiom strongly, weakly, or not at all. We split these proofs into two parts:
We start by examining the OWA-rules, before we turn to sequential rules. Moreover,
within each section, because often similar ideas are required, we group the results by the
axioms. For each axiom, the proofs for the different rules from the considered class can
be found next to each other. For an overview of the results, we refer to Table 1 from
the main body of the paper. We present the different axioms in the same order as they
appear in Table 1.
A.3.1 OWA-rules
We only consider non-negative normalized OWA-vectors Λ, that is, vectors in which all
entries are non-negative and the largest entry is one. It is easily possible to normalize
arbitrary OWA-vectors by dividing all entries by the maximum entry in the vector. To
explain how we will reason about OWA-rules in the following, let us look at the following
line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 1 0 8
b 2 4 5
c 0 6 7
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Consider the line-up (a, b, c). It consists of one candidate-position pair with score 1,
namely a who is assigned to p1, one candidate-position pair with score 4, namely b who
is assigned to p2, and one candidate-position pair of score 7 namely, c who is assigned
to p3. Now, imagine that we want to compute the score assigned to this outcome by the
harmonic rule, that is, fΛ
har
with Λhar = (1, 12 ,
1
3). The score is the sum of the highest score
of a candidate-position pair plus 12 times the second highest score of a candidate-position
pair plus 13 times the lowest score of a candidate-position pair. So for the line-up (a, b, c)
it is 7 + 12 ∗ 4 + 13 ∗ 1 = 1113 . We denote the score of (a, b, c) under the harmonic rule
as Λhar(a, b, c) = 13 ∗ 1 + 12 ∗ 4 + 7. Note that we sort the terms of the sum by the ordering
of the candidates in the line-up. For instance, the score of the line-up (b, a, c) under the
harmonic rule is Λhar(b, a, c) = 12 ∗2+ 13 ∗0+1∗7. We start by examining non-wastefulness.
Theorem 1. All OWA-rules fΛ are weakly non-wasteful and weakly score Pareto optimal.
For an OWA vector Λ with only strictly positive entries, fΛ is strongly non-wasteful and
score Pareto optimal.
Proof. First of all, note that weak score Pareto optimality implies weak non-wastefulness.
To prove that all OWA-rules fΛ are weakly score Pareto optimal, for the sake of contra-
diction, let us assume that fΛ has returned only score Pareto dominated line-ups. Let pi
be one of these line-ups, which is score Pareto dominated by some line-up pi′. However,
this implies that Λ(pi′) ≥ Λ(pi), meaning that pi′ is also selected as a winning line-up.
Note that for all Λ with strictly positive entries, it even holds that Λ(pi′) > Λ(pi)
and thereby that only score Pareto optimal line-ups are selected. However, for OWA-
vectors Λ with a zero entry at position i, fΛ is not strongly score Pareto optimal. To see
this, consider an election where all scores are different natural numbers. Let pi be a line-up
in which some position p ∈ P has the i-th highest score. However, then the outcome pi′
in which each position except p gets assigned the same candidate and p gets assigned a
candidate c with scorep(c) = scorep(pi) − 1 is still a winning line-up but obviously score
Pareto dominated by pi′.
The same arguments can also be used to prove the statement for non-wastefulness.
Theorem 2. For all OWA-vectors Λ 6= (1, 0, . . . , 0), fΛ is not weakly reasonable satisfy-
ing. For Λ = (1, 0, . . . , 0), fΛ is weakly but not strongly reasonably satisfying.
Proof. Here and in some of the following proofs, we prove the two negative parts only
for OWA-vectors of size two. However, it is easily possible to generalize the provided
counterexamples to arbitrary OWAs of size k > 2 by inserting k − 2 positions and, for
each position, a designated candidate. For each inserted position, all candidates except
the designated candidate have a high negative score, while the designated candidate has
a score which is either above every score used in the example or slightly below every score
used in the example. By selecting how many of the k − 2 designated candidates have a
score above or below the scores from the example, it is possible to select the window in
the OWA-vector the example accounts for.
Let us consider the following two-candidates two-positions line-up election. Let Λ be
an arbitrary length-two OWA-vector without zero entries and let 0 < x < 1 be the smaller
of the two entries of Λ (i.e., we have either Λ = (1, x) or Λ = (x, 1); we will treat the two
cases (1, 0) and (0, 1) separately). Let us consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 1 + y2
b 0 1
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with y = x. In this election, outcome (a, b) has score 1 + x under OWA-vector Λ, while
outcome (b, a) depending on whether Λ is decreasing or increasing has score either 1 + x2
or x+ x·x2 . Consequently, (a, b) is selected as the unique winner by all f
Λ with Λ 6= (1, 0)
and Λ 6= (0, 1). However, in the outcome (a, b), the candidate-position pair (a, p2) is
reasonably dissatisfied, as a’s score for position p2 is higher than b’s score for position p2
and higher than a’s score for position p1.
For Λ = (0, 1), we can use the election from above with arbitrary strictly positive y.
In any case, fΛ will select (a, b) as the unique winning line-up. In this line up, the
candidate-position pair (a, p2) is reasonably dissatisfied.
To prove that f (1,0,... ) is weakly reasonable satisfying, let pi be a winning line-up of
some line-up election under f (1,0,... ). Let (c, p) be the candidate-position pair with the
highest score in pi. It follows that this is the highest score c can achieve and the highest
score p can achieve, as otherwise pi would not be a winning line-up. Moreover, all line-
ups pi′ with pip = pi′p are also winning line-ups. One of them is guaranteed to be reasonable
satisfying, as all line-ups provided by the max-first rule are included in them. Clearly,
due to the zero entries, one can easily construct examples where some of these winning
line-ups cause reasonable dissatisfaction.
Theorem 3. For all OWA-vectors Λ 6= (1, . . . 1), fΛ is not weakly score consistent. The
utilitarian rule, fut, is strongly score consistent.
Proof. To prove the first part, let us consider the following two-candidates two-positions
line-up election that can be extended to an arbitrary number of candidates and positions:
E:
C
P
p1 p2
a 4 3
b 2 1
E′:
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 3
b 2 4
E∗:
C
P
p1 p2
a 5 6
b 4 5
For f (1,x) with x ∈ [0, 1), in the first election E, it holds that Λ(a, b) = 4 + x > 2x+ 3 =
Λ(b, a). In the second election, it holds that Λ(a, b) = x+ 4 > 2x+ 3 = Λ(b, a). However,
in the combined election E∗, where we summed up the score matrices of the first two
elections, it holds that Λ(a, b) = 5+5x < 4x+6 = Λ(b, a). Hence, weak score consistency
is violated.
For f (x,1) with x ∈ [0, 1), in the first election, it holds that Λ(a, b) = 4x+1 < 2+3x =
Λ(b, a) in the first election. In the second election, it holds that Λ(a, b) = 1 + 4x <
2 + 3x = Λ(b, a). However, in the combined election E∗, where we summed up the score
matrices of the first two elections, it holds that Λ(a, b) = 5x+ 5 > 4 + 6x = Λ(b, a), which
violates score consistency.
It remains to prove that fut is strongly score consistent. Let pi be some winning
line-up in the two original elections E = (S, C, P ) and E′ = (S′, C, P ). We show that pi
is a winner in E∗. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a line-
up pi′ with a higher utilitarian score than pi in the combined election E∗ = (S + S′, C, P ).
However, as it holds that the score of a line-up in E∗ is equal to the sum of the scores
of this line-up in E and E′, this implies that for at least one of the two initial elections
it also needs to hold that the score of pi′ is higher than the score of pi. However, this
contradicts the assumption that pi is a winning line-up for both E and E′.
To prove that the utilitarian rule also satisfies condition (b) of score consistency, let pi
be some winning line-up pi of the combined election E∗ that is also a winning line-up in
both E and E′ (such pi must exist due to the above argument for the first direction).
Let ΛutE (y) denote the utilitarian score of a line-up y in an election E. Let pi
′ 6= pi be
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another line-up that is also winning in the combined election (if such a line-up exists).
We show that pi′ is a winner in E and E∗ as well. Since both pi′ and pi win in E∗,
it holds that ΛutE∗(pi) = Λ
ut
E∗(pi
′). Moreover, as pi wins in E and E′, ΛutE (pi) ≥ ΛutE (pi′)
and ΛutE′(pi) ≥ ΛutE′(pi′). For every line-up x, we have that ΛutE∗(x) = ΛutE (x) + ΛutE′(x),
which implies that ΛutE (pi) = Λ
ut
E (pi
′) and ΛutE′(pi) = Λ
ut
E′(pi
′). Hence, pi′ is a winning
line-up in E and E′.
Theorem 4. The harmonic rule, fhar, and the inverse harmonic rule, f ihar, violate weak
position consistency. The egalitarian rule, f eg, and the utilitarian rule, fut, are weak but
not strong position consistent.
Proof. Harmonic rule fhar: Let P ′ = {p1, p2} and P ′′ = {p2, p3} and let E∗ = (S, C, P ′ ∪
P ′′) be the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 1 3 0
b 3 4.1 0
c 0 0 5
In the first sub-election, E′ = (S, C, P ′), it holds that Λhar(a, b) = 12 · 1 + 1 · 4.1 >
1 · 3 + 12 · 3 = Λhar(b, a). Thus, (a, b) is the unique winning line-up. In the second
sub-election, E′′ = (S, C, P ′′), (b, c) is the unique winning line-up. However, in the full
election E∗, Λhar(a, b, c) = 13 · 1 + 12 · 4.1 + 1 · 5 < 12 · 3 + 13 · 3 + 1 · 5 = Λhar(b, a, c).
Thereby, (a, b, c) is not a winning line-up, which violates weak position consistency.
Inverse harmonic rule f ihar: Let P ′ = {p1, p2} and P ′′ = {p2, p3} and let E∗ = (S, C, P ′ ∪
P ′′) be the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 2 1 0
b 334 2 0
c 0 0 12
In the first sub-election, E′ = (S, C, P ′), (a, b) is the unique winning line-up,
as Λihar(a, b) = 12 · 2 + 1 · 2 > 12 · 334 + 1 · 1 = Λihar(b, a). In the second sub-
election, E′′ = (S, C, P ′′), (b, c) is the unique winning line-up. However, in the full
election E∗, Λihar(a, b, c) = 13 · 2 + 12 · 2 + 1 · 12 < 13 · 334 + 12 · 1 + 1 · 12 = Λihar(b, a, c).
Thereby, (a, b, c) is not a winning line-up, which violates weak position consistency.
Egalitarian rule f eg: We start by proving that this rule satisfies weak position consistency.
Assume that E∗ = (S, C, P ) is a line-up election and P ′, P ′′ ⊆ P with P ′∪P ′′ = P . Let pi′
be a winning line-up of the election E′ = (S, C, P ′) and pi′′ be a winning line-up of the
election E′′ = (S, C, P ′′), where pi′ and pi′′ are overlapping-disjoint. We claim that pi′ ∪pi′′
is then a winning line-up of the full election E∗. First of all, note that for all outcomes pi∗
of the full election E∗ it holds that min(Λeg(pi∗|P ),Λeg(pi∗|P ′)) = Λeg(pi∗). Thereby, the
existence of an outcome of the combined election pi∗ with higher score than pi′∪pi′′ implies
that either Λeg(pi∗|P ′) > Λeg(pi′), which contradicts the assumption that pi′ is a winning
line-up of E′, or Λeg(pi∗|P ′′) > Λeg(pi′′), which contradicts the assumption that pi′′ is a
winning line-up of E′′.
To prove that f eg does not satisfy strong position consistency, we exploit the property
that not all winning line-ups are score Pareto optimal. Consider the following line-up
election E∗ = (S, C, P ):
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C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 1 0 0
b 0 3 2
c 0 2 3
In the sub-election on P ′ = {p1, p2}, (a, b) is the unique winning line-up. On P ′′ =
{p2, p3}, (b, c) is the unique winning line-up. However, in the full election, (a, c, b) is also
a winning line-up, which violates strong position consistency.
Utilitarian rule fut: We prove that fut satisfies weak but not strong position consistency.
Let again E∗ = (S, C, P ) be a line-up elections and P ′, P ′′ ⊆ P with P ′ ∪P ′′ = P . In the
following, we write L to denote P ′ \ P ′′, M to denote P ′ ∩ P ′′ and R to denote P ′′ \ P ′.
Assume that pi′ is a winning line-up of the first sub-election E′ = (S, C, P ′) on P ′
and pi′′ of the second sub-election E′′ = (S, C, P ′′) on P ′′, where pi′ and pi′′ are overlapping-
disjoint. We claim that pi∗ = pi′ ∪ pi′′ is then a winning line-up of the full election E∗.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a line-up pi∗ of E∗ with a
higher utilitarian score than pi∗. Let pi′ := pi∗|P ′ and pi′′ := pi∗|P ′′ . As pi′ and pi′′ are
winning line-ups, it needs to hold that Λut(pi′) ≥ Λut(pi′) and Λut(pi′′) ≥ Λut(pi′′). From
this it follows that
Λut(pi∗|L) + Λut(pi∗|M ) ≤ Λut(pi∗|L) + Λut(pi∗|M ) and
Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R) ≤ Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R).
Hence,
Λut(pi∗|L) + 2 · Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R) ≤ Λut(pi∗|L) + 2 · Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R) (1)
Recall that, assuming that pi∗ has a higher score than pi, it needs to hold that:
Λut(pi∗) =Λut(pi∗|L) + Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R) >
Λut(pi∗|L) + Λut(pi∗|M ) + Λut(pi∗|R) = Λut(pi∗).
(2)
The only possibility that both inequality (1) and (2) hold at the same time is
that Λut(pi∗|M ) − Λut(pi∗|M ) = x and Λut(pi∗|L) − Λut(pi∗|L) = y and Λut(pi∗|R) −
Λut(pi∗|R) = y for some x, y, z > 0 with x < y + z.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that an outcome pi∗ that fulfills the thee con-
ditions specified above exists. We now compare pi∗ and pi∗ and argue why this is not
possible. Let us first look at the differences of pi∗ and pi∗ on L: Because of the optimality
of pi′, it is not possible to increase the score of pi∗ on L by using candidates who are not
already assigned in pi∗ to positions from M . Thereby, in pi∗|L some candidates from pi∗|L
must have been replaced by some candidates from pi∗|M . From the optimality of pi′ it
follows that by modifying L as described above, an increase of Λut(pi∗|L) by some x always
results in a decrease of at least x on Λut(pi∗|M ). Moreover, it is never possible to increase
the score on R simultaneously by such rearrangements, as all candidates that might get
free are candidates from R which are—due to the optimality of pi′′— not usable to increase
the score on L. As the same argument also holds for R, it is never possible to increase
the scores as required and thereby pi∗ is always a winning line-up.
We consider the following line-up election E∗ = (S, C, P ) to prove that fut violates
strong position consistency:
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C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 0 0 0
b 1 1 0
c 0 0 0
In the sub-election on P ′ = {p1, p2}, (a, b) is a winning outcome. On P ′′ = {p2, p3}, (b, c)
is winning outcome. However, in the full election E∗, (b, a, c) is a winning outcome.
However (a, c) is not a winning outcome of the second sub-election on P ′′.
Theorem 5. The utilitarian rule, fut, satisfies strong monotonicity. The egalitarian
rule, f eg, violates weak monotonicity. For all OWA-vectors Λ with at least three succeeding
non-zero entries of which the last two are unequal, fΛ does not satisfy weak monotonicity.
Proof. Utilitarian rule fut: We show that fut satisfies strong monotonicity. Let pi be
a winning line-up of some line-up election (S, C, P ). Then, by increasing scorep(c) for
some (c, p) ∈ C × P with c = pip by some arbitrary x, the score of pi is increased by x.
Moreover, the score of all other line-ups is also increased by at most x. Thereby, pi remains
a winning line-up, and no new winning line-ups can be created, as every line-up that is
winning in the modified elections needs to have the same utilitarian score as pi before the
modification.
Egalitarian rule f eg: Consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2
a 0 3
b 3 0
c 4 0
Under the egalitarian rule, (b, a) is a winning line-up of this election. However, after
increasing the score of a on p2 to four, (b, a) is no longer a winning line-up, as now (c, a)
is the unique winning line-up.
(Inverse) harmonic rule fhar/f ihar: Finally, we prove that for all OWA-vectors Λ with at
least three succeeding non-zero entries of which the last two are not equal, fΛ does not
satisfy weak monotonicity. Note that this also includes the harmonic rule and inverse
harmonic rule. Let Λ = (x, y, z). We assume that x 6= 0 and y 6= z. Consider the
following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 4 1 0
b 4 + 0.5y+1.5zx 3 0
c 0 0 2
Clearly, in all winning line-ups, c is assigned to p3. Thereby, the two line-ups which could
be winning are (a, b, c) and (b, a, c) with scores Λ(a, b, c) = 4x + 3y + 2z and Λ(b, a, c) =
x · (4 + 0.5y+1.5zx ) + 1z + 2y = 4x + 2.5y + 2.5z. We now increase scorep3(c) to 3. The
scores of (a, b, c) and (b, a, c) change as follows: Λ(a, b, c) = 4x+ 3y + 3z and Λ(b, a, c) =
4x+ 3.5y + 2.5z. Assuming now that y > z, (a, b, c) is the unique winning line-up in the
original election. However, in the altered election, (b, a, c) is the unique winning line-up.
This violates weak monotonicity. Assuming z > y, (b, a, c) is the unique winning line-up
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in the original election, while (a, b, c) is the unique winning line-up in the altered election.
This violates weak monotonicity.
Theorem 6. The egalitarian rule, f eg, satisfies weak line-up enlargement monotonicity
but fails to satisfy strong line-up enlargement monotonicity. The utilitarian rule, fut,
satisfies strong line-up enlargement monotonicity. The harmonic rule, fhar, and inverse
harmonic rule, f ihar, both fail weak line-up enlargement monotonicity.
Proof. Egalitarian rule f eg: We prove that f eg satisfies weak line-up enlargement mono-
tonicity. Let pi be a winning line-up of the initial election E = (S, C, P ) of egalitarian
score x. Let pi′ be a winning line-up of the extended election E′ = (S′, C, P ∪ {p∗}) such
that there exists a candidate c ∈ C with c /∈ pi′ and c ∈ pi. Let y be the egalitarian score
of pi′. It needs to hold that x ≥ y, as otherwise pi cannot be a winning line-up of the initial
election. We claim that it is always possible to construct from pi′ a winning line-up pi′′
of the extended election such that piP ⊆ pi′′P∪{p∗}. We construct pi′′ from pi and pi′ using
the following iterative procedure. Initially, we set pi′′ := pi′. As long as there exists a
candidate c ∈ C with c ∈ pi and c /∈ pi′′, we set pi′′pi(c) = c. As the egalitarian score of pi
is x, for all c ∈ pi, it holds that scorepi(c)(c) ≥ x. Thus, the egalitarian score of pi′′ will not
fall below y by the described replacements. Consequently, pi′′ is a winning line-up of the
extended election E′ with all candidates appearing in pi also appearing in pi′′.
However, f eg fails to satisfy strong line-up enlargement monotonicity. To see this,
consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p
∗
a 3 0 0
b 2 3 0
c 0 2 0
d 0 0 1
We consider the election on p1 and p2 as the initial election. In this initial election, (a, b)
is the unique winning line-up. However, as the new position decreases the lowest score
in an optimal outcome, (b, c, d) is also a winning line-up in the extended election. Hence,
strong line-up-monotonicity is violated.
Utilitarian rule fut: For a proof thatfut satisfies weak line-up enlargement monotonicity
see Proposition 2.
Using a similar argument as in Proposition 2, we prove that fut is even strong line-up
enlargement monotone. Let pi′ be a winning outcome of the extended election and pi a
winning outcome of the original election where there exists a candidate c ∈ C that is part
of pi but not of pi′, that is, c ∈ pi but c /∈ pi′. To prove that for every winning outcome of the
extended election, there always exists a winning outcome of the original election consisting
of a subset of candidates of the extended outcome, we construct from pi an outcome of
the original election pi with pi|P ⊆ pi′P∪{p∗} as follows. We start by setting pi := pi.
Subsequently, as long as there exists a position p ∈ P with pip /∈ pi′ or an unassigned
position p ∈ P , we set pip = pi′p. If pi′p was already assigned to some other position in pi,
then we delete pi′p from the position she was assigned to in pi.
It obviously holds that pi ⊆ pi′. We claim that pi is a winning line-up of the initial
election. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is not the case, that
is, Λut(pi) < Λut(pi). Let P˜ ⊆ P be the set of positions which have been modified in pi,
where it needs to hold that Λut(pi′|
P˜
) < Λut(pi|
P˜
). Let pi′alt be a line-up resulting from
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taking pi′ and modifying it such that pi′alt|P˜ = pi|P˜ . Consequently, pi′alt has a higher
utilitarian score than that of pi′. It remains to argue that after the modification pi′alt
remains a valid line-up, that is, every candidate is assigned at most once in pi′alt. To prove
this it is enough to show that, for each p ∈ P˜ , if pip ∈ pi′, then pi′(pip) ∈ P˜ . Let us fix
some position p ∈ P˜ such that pip ∈ pi′. Note that position p had to be empty at some
point during the construction of pi. This implies that in some preceding step, pip had been
assigned to some other position in pi. However, by the construction of pi, each c ∈ pi′ can
be only assigned to position pi′(c) in pi. Thus, since pip must have once been assigned, pip
was assigned to position pi′(pip); hence, pi′(pip) ∈ P˜ . So pi′alt is indeed a valid line-up.
Harmonic rule fhar: To prove that fhar violates weak line-up enlargement monotonicity,
consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p
∗
a 0.5 0 0
b 3 3.3 0
c 0 1 0
d 0 0 4
Let the election on p1 and p2 be the initial election. The underlying idea of the
counterexample is that the weighting of the scores may change after adding an
additional position. In the initial election, (a, b) is the unique winning line-up
as Λ(a, b) = 12 · 0.5 + 3.3 > 3 + 12 · 1 = Λ(b, c). However, in the full election, (b, c, d)
is the unique winning line-up, as Λ(b, c, d) = 12 ·3+ 13 ·1+4 > 13 ·0.5+ 12 ·3.3+4 = Λ(a, b, d).
Inverse harmonic rule f ihar: To prove that f ihar violates weak line-up enlargement mono-
tonicity, let us consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p
∗
a 1.7 0 0
b 3 1.7 0
c 0 1 0
d 0 0 1
Again, let the election on p1 and p2 be the initial election. In the initial election, (a, b)
is the unique winning line-up as Λ(a, b) = 12 · 1.7 + 1.7 > 12 · 3 + 1 = Λ(b, c). However, in
the full election, (b, c, d) is the unique winning line-up, as Λ(b, c, d) = 13 · 3 + 12 · 1 + 1 >
1
3 · 1.7 + 12 · 1.7 + 1 = Λ(a, b, d).
A.3.2 Sequential rules
We now turn to sequential rules and prove all statements from Table 1. We group again
the statements for all three rules by the axioms. Note that for the fixed-order rule, without
loss of generality, we assume that the positions in P = {p1, . . . , pq} are filled in increasing
order of their index, that is, p1 is filled first, then p2 is filled, and so on.
Theorem 7. All sequential rules satisfy strong non-wastefulness.
Proof. Assume that pi is selected as a winning line-up by some sequential rule f seq and
that pi is wasteful because there exist a c /∈ pi and a position p ∈ P such that scorep(c) >
scorep(pi). This implies that c would have been selected instead of pip to fill position p.
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Theorem 8. The fixed-order rule, f seqfix , and the max-first rule, f
seq
max, are weakly but not
strongly score Pareto optimal. The min-first rule, f seqmin, fails weak score Pareto optimality.
Proof. Fixed-order rule f seqfix : We prove that f
seq
fix is weak score Pareto optimal. Assume
that pi is a winning line-up which is score Pareto dominated by some line-up score Pareto
optimal line-up pi′. Then, it follows that there exists a winning outcome pi that score
Pareto dominates pi on the first i positions for some i ∈ [1, k]: This can be constructed by
choosing at every position p the candidate with the maximum score. If ties are present,
then choose the candidate pi′p if she is among the candidates with the highest score and
otherwise arbitrarily some candidate with the highest score. If, for all positions p ∈ P , pi′p
got selected, then we are done, as this implies that the score Pareto optimal line-up pi′
is winning under the fixed-order rule. Otherwise, let pi be the first position where pi
′
pi is
not selected, which implies that there exists a candidate with a higher score for pi and
that this candidate is selected. Thereby, the score of pi is equal to the score of pi′ on
the first i − 1 positions and higher than the score of pi′ at position pi. Now, either pi is
score Pareto optimal and we are done or there exists again a line-up that score Pareto
dominates pi. If this is again the case, then we can again construct a winning outcome pi′
that score Pareto dominates pi on the first i positions for some i ∈ [1, k]. To prove that
this process converges to an outcome outputted by the fixed-order rule that is score Pareto
optimal, we read the score vector of an outcome (scorep1(pi), . . . , scorepk(pi)) as a decimal
number and call this the line-up’s score number. As described above, each time a winning
outcome pi is score Pareto dominated by some outcome pi′, there exists a winning line-up pi
with a higher score number than pi. The winning line-up with the highest score number
needs to be score Pareto optimal.
In contrast to this, f seqfix is not strongly score Pareto optimal. In the following line-up
election, (a, b) is a winning line-up, where (a, b) is score Pareto dominated by (b, a), which,
of course, also is a winning outcome.
C
P
p1 p2
a 2 1
b 2 0
Max-first rule f seqmax: To prove that f
seq
max satisfies weak score Pareto optimality, we apply
the same reasoning as before. However, in this case, the score number of an outcome is
the score vector sorted in decreasing order. The example from above can also be used to
prove that f seqmax does not satisfy strong score Pareto optimality.
Min-first rule f seqmin: Finally, we prove that f
seq
min violates weak score Pareto optimality.
Here, it is not possible to modify a dominated outcome such that certain positions or
the maximum scores always improve. To prove that f seqmin violates weak score Pareto
optimality, consider the following line-up election:
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 1 1 3
b 1 3 2
c 0 0 0
Because all candidates have at most score one on p1, p1 is required to pick first but is
indifferent between a and b. Assuming that p1 picks a, p3 is required to pick next and
picks b. Then, p2 gets assigned c. Assuming that p1 picks b, p2 is required to pick next and
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picks a. Then, p3 gets assigned c. Consequently, the two outcomes of the game are (a, c, b)
and (b, a, c). However (a, c, b) is score Pareto dominated by (b, c, a) and (b, a, c) is score
Pareto dominated by (a, b, c). Note that (a, b, c) is not a winning line-up, as in the case
where position p1 picks a, position p3 is required to select next, and not, as it would be
necessary to achieve this outcome, position p2. Thereby, both winning line-ups returned
by f seqmin are score Pareto dominated.
Theorem 9. The max-first rule, f seqmax, satisfies strong reasonable satisfaction. The fixed-
order rule, f seqfix , and the min-first rule, f
seq
min, violate weak reasonable satisfaction.
Proof. Fixed-order rule f seqfix and min-first rule f
seq
min: We start by presenting a counterex-
ample for f seqfix and f
seq
min proving that both rules do not satisfy weak reasonable satisfaction.
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 2
b 0 1
Both f seqfix and f
seq
min return (a, b) as the unique winner. However, in the outcome (b, a),
the candidate-position pair (a, p2) is reasonably dissatisfied.
For the max-first rule f seqmax, see Proposition 3.
Theorem 10. The fixed-order rule, f seqfix , satisfies weak but not strong score consistency.
The max-first rule, f seqmax, and the min-first rule, f
seq
min, both violate weak score consistency.
Proof. Fixed-order rule f seqfix : If pi is a winning line-up in both E = (S, C, P ) and E
′ =
(S′, C, P ), then it holds that pipi had the maximum score for position p among all can-
didates not already assigned to some position {pj | 1 ≤ j < i} in both E and E′. By
induction and by the fact that the score of a candidate for a position in (S + S′, C, P ) is
the sum of her scores in E and E′, it follows that the same is true in (S + S′, C, P ).
However, the strong version of this property does not hold:
E:
C
P
p1 p2
a 3 1
b 3 3
c 0 3
E′:
C
P
p1 p2
a 3 3
b 3 3
c 0 1
E∗:
C
P
p1 p2
a 6 4
b 6 6
c 0 4
In both elections E and E′, (a, b) is a winning line-up. Strong score consistency is violated,
as for the combined election E∗, (b, a) is also a winning line-up. However, (b, a) is not a
winning line-up in election E.
Max-first rule f seqmax: Weak score consistency does not hold by the following example:
E:
C
P
p1 p2
a 4 3
b 2 1
E′:
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 3
b 2 4
E∗:
C
P
p1 p2
a 5 6
b 4 5
In both elections E and E′, (a, b) is the unique winning line-up, while in the combined
election E∗, (b, a) is the unique winning line-up.
Min-first rule f seqmin: The min-first rule violates weak score consistency by examining the
following line-up election:
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E:
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 3
b 0 0
E′:
C
P
p1 p2
a 0 0
b 4 1
E∗:
C
P
p1 p2
a 1 3
b 4 1
In both elections E and E′, (a, b) is selected as the unique winning line-up. However, in
the combined election E∗, the unique winning line-up is (b, a).
Theorem 11. All three sequential rules satisfy weak position consistency but fail to satisfy
strong position consistency.
Proof. We start by proving that all considered sequential rules satisfy weak position con-
sistency, before presenting a line-up election on which all all rules violate strong position
consistency.
Fixed-order rule f seqfix : Let E = (S, C, P ) be a line-up election and P
′, P ′′ ⊆ P two subsets
of positions such that P ′ ∪ P ′′ = P . To prove that weak position consistency is satisfied,
let pi′ be a winning line-up in the election E′ = (S, C, P ′) on P ′ and pi′′ be an overlapping-
disjoint winning line-up of the election E′′ = (S, C, P ′′) on P ′′. If we now consider a
combination of the two elections where the order within the sets P ′ and P ′′ remains
unchanged, then pi′ ∪ pi′′ is a winning line-up. This follows from the fact that pi′ and pi′′
are disjoint on the disjoint sets of positions. Thus, no position will “steal” a candidate
from some other position.
Max-first rule f seqmax and min-first rule f
seq
min: For the max-first rule and min-first rule, the
argument is analgous to the above one, as again the order within P in which the positions
are filled and the order within P ′ in which the positions are filled remain unchanged.
To prove that none of the three rules satisfies strong position consistency, consider the
following line-up election E = (S, C, P ):
C
P
p1 p2 p3
a 1 0 0
b 0 1 0
c 1 0 1
Let P ′ = {p1, p2} and P ′′ = {p2, p3}. The winning line-ups of the election E′ = (S, C, P ′)
are (a, b) and (c, b). The unique winning line-up of the election E′′ = (S, C, P ′′) is (b, c).
The two line-ups (a, b) and (b, c) are overlapping-disjoint coalitions. Nevertheless, for the
winning line-up pi∗ = (c, b, a) of the full election E, there do not exist two overlapping-
disjoint winning coalitions pi′ and pi′′ such that pi∗ = pi ∪ pi′.
Theorem 12. The fixed-order rule, f seqfix , and the max-first rule, f
seq
max, both satisfy strong
monotonicity. The min-first rule, f seqmin, violates weak monotonicity.
Proof. Fixed-order rule f seqfix : The fixed-order rule satisfies strong monotonicity, as if the
score of some candidate gets increased for the position she got assigned to, then this
position will select again this candidate once it is the position’s turn.
Max-first rule f seqmax: If the score of an assigned candidate-position pair from a line-up pi is
increased, then this pair moves up in the list of candidate-position pairs sorted by scores.
In the max-first rule, the first still realizable element from this list is always chosen as the
next assigned pair. Thereby, breaking ties in the right way, all candidate-position pairs
from pi will still be selected. Moreover, no new winning line-ups will be created.
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Min-first rule f seqmin: To prove that f
seq
min violates weak monotonicity, consider the following
election:
C
P
p1 p2
a 2 1
b 0 0
The unique winning line-up is (b, a). However, after increasing scorep2(a) by two, the
unique winning line-up is (a, b).
Theorem 13. The fixed-order rule, f seqfix , and the max-first rule, f
seq
max, both satisfies
strong line-up enlargement monotonicity. The min-first rule, f seqmin, violates weak line-up
enlargement monotonicity.
Proof. Fixed-order rule f seqfix : To prove that f
seq
fix satisfies weak line-up enlargement mono-
tonicity, let P = {p1, . . . , pq} and let j be the place in the ordering of positions at which p∗
is inserted. To prove weak line-up enlargement monotonicity, let pi be a winning outcome
of the initial election without p∗. From this, we construct an outcome pi′ of the extended
election as follows. For i ∈ [1, j − 1], we assign pipi to pi. For i = j, we assign to p∗ the
remaining candidate with the highest score on p∗. For i ∈ [j + 1, q + 1], we assign pipi−1
to pi−1 if pipi−1 is still unassigned and has the highest score among all unassigned candi-
dates; otherwise, we pick an arbitrary unassigned candidate with the highest score on pj−1.
The line-up pi′ is obviously a winning line-up under the sequential rule in the extended
election.
We prove by induction that for each step i ∈ [1, q + 1] of the construction, the can-
didates who have been assigned to pi′ at steps 1, . . . i are a superset of pi{p1,...,pi−1}. From
this it immediately follows that piP ⊆ pi′P∪{p∗}. For i ∈ [1, j], the induction statement is
trivially fulfilled, as it holds that pi′pi = pipi , for all i ∈ [1, j − 1]. Let i ∈ [j + 1, q + 1] and
assume that the hypothesis holds for i−1. At step i, we fill position pi−1. If it holds at this
step that pipi−1 has been already assigned earlier, then we are done. If this it not the case,
then we claim that pipi−1 has the highest score on pi−1 among all remaining candidates
and is therefore assigned to pi−1 in pi′. Recalling that by the induction hypothesis the
remaining candidates are a subset of C \ {pip1 , . . . , pipi−2} and that pi is a winning line-up
of the initial election, that is, pipi−1 has the highest score among all C \ {pip1 , . . . , pipi−2},
the claim holds. From this, the induction step directly follows.
It is possible to prove that the sequential rule also satisfies condition (b) of line-up
enlargement monotonicity and, thereby, also strong line-up enlargement monotonicity
using a similar argument. Let pi′ be a winning line-up of the extended election. We
construct a winning line-up pi of the initial election as follows. For i ∈ [1, j − 1], we
set pipi = pi
′
pi . For i ∈ [j, q], we assign to pipi the candidate with the highest score among
the remaining candidates and break ties by always selecting an unassigned candidate
from {pi′pj , . . . pi′pi , pi′p∗} if possible. Clearly, pi is a winning line-up of the initial election.
For the sake of contradiction, let i ∈ [j, q] be the smallest index where a candidate c ∈ C
not being part of {pi′pj , . . . pi′pi , pi′p∗} is selected. However, this implies that pi′ is not a
winning line-up of the extended election, as c has a higher score than pi′pi on pi. Note
further that c is by definition also still unassigned when pipi is filled in pi
′. Hence, such an
index cannot exist proving that piP ⊆ pi′P∪{p∗}.
Max-first rule f seqmax: To prove that f
seq
max satisfies weak line-up enlargement monotonicity,
let pi be a winning outcome of some election (S, C, P ). From pi, we construct an outcome pi′
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of the extended election (S′, C, P ∪{pq+1}) as follows. At each step i ∈ [1, q+1], we assign
the candidate-position pair (c, p) ∈ C × P with the highest score among all remaining
pairs. If there exist multiple such pairs, then we select a pair with (c, p) ∈ pi and if multiple
such pairs exist, then we select the pair that has been first assigned in the construction
of pi. Line-up pi′ is obviously a winning line-up under the max-first rule. It remains to
prove that piP ⊆ pi′P∪{pq+1}.
Let j∗ ∈ [1, q] denote the step in which pq+1 is filled. Moreover, let i1, . . . iq be a list of
indices such that position pij is filled in the j-th step when creating pi and let i
′
1, . . . i
′
q+1 be
a list of indices such that position pi′j is filled in the j-th step when creating pi
′. We prove
by induction that for all j ∈ [1, q + 1] it holds that the candidates assigned to pi′ after j
steps are a superset of the candidates assigned to pi after j − 1 steps, which directly
implies that piP ⊆ pi′P∪{pq+1}. For j ∈ [1, j∗], the hypothesis clearly holds, as ik = i′k
and pipik = pi
′
pi′
k
,∀k ∈ [1, j∗ − 1]. For j ∈ [j∗ + 1, q + 1], we assume that the induction
statement holds for j − 1. At step j, if pipij−1 is already assigned in pi′ before step j, then
we are done. Otherwise, we claim that the candidate-position pair (pij−1 , pipij−1 ) will be
assigned in this step in the construction of pi′. First of all, note that by the induction
hypothesis and as this pair has been assigned in pi, pipij−1 has the highest score among the
remaining candidates on pij−1 . Moreover, note that by the induction hypothesis, there
cannot exist an earlier step where pij−1 was assigned some other candidate because this
requires that this candidate has a higher score on pij−1 than pipij−1 and thereby that this
candidate would have also been assigned to pij−1 in the construction of pi. Furthermore,
it needs to hold that (pij−1 , pipij−1 ) is the candidate-position pair with the highest score,
as there only exist j − 2 pairs with a higher score in the construction of pi and thereby at
most j−1 pairs with a higher score that were all already chosen before in the construction
of pi′.
To prove that condition (b) of line-up-enlargement-monotonicity holds as well, let pi′
be a winning outcome of the larger election and let pi be an outcome of the initial election
on P constructed from pi′ as follows. At each step i ∈ [1, q], we assign the candidate-
position pair (c, p) ∈ C × P with the highest score among all remaining pairs. If there
exist multiple such pairs, then we select a pair (c, p) ∈ pi′, and if multiple such pairs exist,
then we assign the pair that has been first assigned in the construction of pi′.
For the sake of contradiction, let j be the first step in the construction of pi in which a
candidate-position pair (c, p) ∈ C ×P with c /∈ pi′ is assigned. As otherwise c would have
been assigned to p in pi′, this implies that pi′p has already been assigned at step j′ < j
in the construction of pi. Thereby, it needs to hold that scorepi(c)(c) > scorep(c). This
implies that in pi′ it needs to hold that scorepi(c)(pi′) ≥ scorepi(c)(c). However, this in turn
implies that pi′pi(c) must have been assigned in pi at some step j
′′ < j′ and that it needs
to hold that scorepi(pi′
pi(c)
)(pi
′
pi(c)) > scorepi(c)(pi
′
pi(c)). Then, again the argument from above
applies eventually resulting in a contradiction once step 1 is reached.
Min-first rule f seqmin: Consider the following election where we denote by (S, C, P ) the
election on the first four positions and by (S′, C, P ′) the election on all five positions.
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C
P
p1 p2 p3 p4 p
∗
a 0 6 4 0 0
b 2 3 0 0 0
c 7 0 0 5 1
d 1 0 0 0 0
e 0 0 0 1 0
f 0 1 0 0 0
We claim that f seqmin(S, C, P ) = {(d, b, a, c)} and that f seqmin(S′, C, P ′) = {(b, f, a, e, c)}, thus
violating line-up enlargement monotonicity. For the election on the first four positions, p3
is required to pick first and picks a. After that, p2 is required to pick and picks b.
Subsequently, p4 picks c and p1 picks d. Thus, (d, b, a, c) is the unique winning line-up.
For the election on all five positions, the order in which the positions pick will change
because of the presence of p∗: p∗ is required to pick first and picks c. Subsequently, p4
picks e, and p1 picks b. p3 picks a, and p2 picks f . Hence, (b, f, a, e, c) is the unique
winning line-up.
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B Experiments
In the following section, we provide several additional details for the conducted exper-
iments. First of all, the selected soccer formation for our FIFA experiments (Subsec-
tion B.1), the definition of the Gini coefficient (Subsection B.2), and the description of
the first model to generate synthetic data (Subsection B.3) are presented. Subsequently,
in Subsection B.4 and Subsection B.5, we perform a comparison of the different data
models and provide the missing diagrams for the analysis of ten-candidates ten-positions
elections presented in the main body. Finally, we conclude in Subsection B.6 with visu-
alizations of our results for two different setups varying the number of candidates and
positions.
B.1 Soccer Formation
Figure 5 contains a visualization of the chosen formation that we want to fill in our
experiments based on FIFA data. That is, the positions in the conducted experiments
are the different names displayed on the field.
Right striker
Left striker
Central attacking
midfielder
Left
center midfielder
Right
center midfielder
Left
wing-back
Right
wing-back
Right
centre back
Centre back
Left
centre back
Figure 5: Soccer formation used in the experiments on FIFA data.
B.2 Gini Coefficient
The Gini coefficient is a metric to measure the dispersion of a probability distribution;
it is zero for uniform distributions and one for distributions with a unit step cumulative
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distribution function. The Gini coefficient of a tuple X = (x1, . . . , xn) is defined as:
gini(X) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |xi − xj |
2n
∑n
i=1 xi
.
B.3 Model M1
To model that some positions are likely to be correlated, we start by partitioning the
positions into three subsets. For each candidate and each subset, we draw a ground
qualification µ uniformly between 0.4 and 0.7. Subsequently, we sample the scores of this
player for all positions in this subset independently from a Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation 0.15. The results of the different voting methods on data
generated using the M1 data can be found in Figure 7. The performance of all voting
rules on this dataset is slightly worse then on the FIFA data. However, the differences
between the voting rules with respect to the considered metrics is pretty similar to the
patterns observed in the FIFA data.
B.4 Comparison of Data Models
To compare the three models, as the relative conflicting score, we calculated the difference
between the summed score of an utopic outcome and the summed score of a utilitarian
outcome divided by the summed score of the utopic outcome. Moreover, we computed for
all positions the summed score of all candidates on this position. Subsequently, we calcu-
lated the Gini coefficient of the summed scores of positions to measure the distribution of
scores over positions. Lastly, we calculated the social conflict defined as the lowest score
in an egalitarian line-up minus the lowest score in an utilitarian line-up. We compare the
three data models to each other in Figure 6. On the one hand, the M2 model produces
instances with a higher relative conflicting score, a larger Gini coefficient of position scores
and a higher social trade-off compared to the other models. On the other hand, the M1
model and the FIFA data produce similar instances in terms of the considered metrics.
Figure 6: Comparison of different models to generate ten-candidates ten-positions elec-
tions.
B.5 Missing Experimental Results for M1 Model
In Figure 7, we present a comparison of the different voting rules on M1 and FIFA data
for ten players on ten positions. Note that while the general trends are similar on both
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data sets, all voting rules produce slightly worse results on the M1 data. Moreover, the
difference between the voting rules is more profound on the M1 data.
(a) Summed score.
(b) Minimum score.
(c) Gini coefficient of score vector.
(d) Reasonable dissatisfaction.
Figure 7: Comparison of voting rules on M1 and FIFA data.
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B.6 Additional Experimental Results
We also conducted experiments varying the number of positions and candidates. In the
following, we exemplarily include our results for the case with twenty candidates on ten
positions and twenty candidates on twenty positions.
B.6.1 Twenty candidates on ten positions
Here, diagrams for our experiments with twenty candidates on ten positions are displayed.
In Figure 8, instances produced by the three different models are compared to each
other. Note that the general picture is similar to the comparison of the models for ten-
candidates ten-positions elections (see Figure 6). However, here, due to the higher number
of available candidates, the instances exhibit less competition, as overall twenty-candidates
ten-positions instances have lower conflicting score, Gini coefficient, and social conflict
than ten-candidates ten-positions elections. Moreover, in Figure 9, the performance of
the considered voting rules with respect to the summed score of a line-up, the minimum
score in a line-up, the Gini coefficient of the score vector, and the reasonable dissatisfaction
in a line-up are shown. Note that the general trends highlighted in the main body of the
paper still hold while being less visible due to less competition in the data.
Figure 8: Comparison of different models to generate twenty-candidates ten-positions
elections.
(a) Summed score.
34
(b) Minimum score.
(c) Gini coefficient of score vector.
(d) Reasonable dissatisfaction.
Figure 9: Comparison of voting rules on twenty-candidates ten-positions elections using
M1, M2, and FIFA data.
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B.6.2 Twenty candidates on twenty positions
In the following, diagrams presenting our results for experiments with twenty candidates
on twenty positions are shown. We did not use our FIFA data for these experiments,
as in soccer line-ups consist only of ten (or eleven) positions. Moreover, due to limited
computation time, we did not run the experiments in this setting for the inverse harmonic
rule. That is why we omit this rule in all diagrams.
In Figure 10, the instances produced by the three different models are compared
to each other. Considering the selected three metrics, the generated twenty-candidates
twenty-positions instances seem to be pretty similar to the generated ten-candidates ten-
positions instances. Additionally, the outcomes produced by all voting rules except the
inverse harmonic rule are analyzed in Figure 9. Again, the results are pretty similar to
the ten-candidates ten-positions case discussed in the main body of the paper.
Figure 10: Comparison of different models to generate twenty-candidates twenty-positions
elections.
(a) Summed score.
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(b) Minimum score.
(c) Gini coefficient of score vector.
(d) Reasonable dissatisfaction.
Figure 11: Comparison of voting rules on twenty-candidates twenty-positions elections
using M1 and M2 data.
37
